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Corporate philanthropy, reputation risk management and shareholder value: A study 
of Australian corporate giving. 
 
 
Abstract 
This study examines the role of corporate philanthropy in the management of reputation risk 
and shareholder value.  It extends current empirical data about corporate giving by Australian 
companies by examining the interplay between levels of corporate philanthropy with 
corporate reputation and shareholder value.   The reasons behind corporate giving have been 
well researched in academic journals, but examining the direct link between reputation and 
shareholder value in these cases is lacking. The results of this study show that increasing a 
firms’ investment in corporate giving must be done concurrently with an increase in 
reputation risk management in order to increase shareholder value.  That is, the market 
foresees that the impact of corporate giving for a given the level of reputational risk 
management occurs in the future and hence is included in an increase in shareholder value. 
Our results are consistent while controlling for potential endogeneity. This paper assists both 
academics and practitioners by demonstrating that the benefits of corporate philanthropy 
extend beyond a gesture to improve reputation or an attempt to increase financial 
performance, to a direct collaboration between all the factors where the benefits far outweigh 
the costs.  
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Introduction 
 
 The aims of this study are threefold. Firstly to investigate corporate philanthropy in 
Australian listed firms through determining levels of giving as well as to discern where 
possible the motivations behind it.  The second element of this study is to measure corporate 
reputation.  This will be achieved using a comprehensive media analysis.  The third element 
of the study is to determine whether the interaction of corporate philanthropy and reputational 
risk is associated with a change in shareholder value. Consequently, this study extends the 
current empirical data about corporate giving in Australia by examining the interplay between 
levels of corporate philanthropy, corporate reputation and shareholder value.   
 
This research is important for several reasons. Firstly, boards need a definitive base on which 
to judge the benefits of corporate philanthropy to the community and to the sustainability of 
the company itself.  Research to date has tended to focus on how best to measure community 
impact of the corporate contribution, with an estimated 75 types of social measurement now 
in use (Epstein and Buhovac, 2014).  However, while important such impact measurement is 
only one side of the equation. Much has been written about the ‘business case’ for corporate 
philanthropy but the amount of empirical data is outstripped by rhetoric.   
Secondly, economic downturns such as the recent Global Financial Crisis (GFC) are typically 
accompanied by a reduction in corporate giving and corporate giving is slower to recover 
than individual giving
1
. Catalyst Full Disclosure Study of 12 companies reports that in 2010, 
ten of Australia’s largest companies contributed over half a billion dollars to the community. 
Seventy percent of the total funds contributed were donated by Australia’s two largest 
                                                          
1 see for example http://www.worldfuturefound.org/a/Research/Papers/2013/0121/637.html 
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companies, BHP Billiton and Rio Tinto. Relative to profits, contributions to communities 
rose between 2006 and 2009, before falling in 2010. Interestingly, profit accounts for only 
half of the difference between what companies invest while factors such as the nature of the 
industry in which the company operates, its culture or the priorities of senior executives and 
boards account for the other half. Between 50 and 80 percent of the value of all contributions 
are direct cash donations. This suggests that economic uncertainty and the tone at the top of 
corporations influences donations which in turn are related to the certainty of future cash 
flows. This means corporate giving is often reduced in the times when it is particularly 
needed. 
Thirdly, corporate support is needed if non-profit organisations are to survive. As Madden 
and Scaife assert (2007:151) ‘Giving may be increasing, but so too are non-profit numbers 
and traditional government funding is waning’.  They also point out that current corporate 
giving forms only a fraction of the funds for the non-profit sector and much scope exists for 
corporate giving to grow and boost community coffers. Consequently, research developed 
from the business perspective can inform non-profit research and practice. Encouraging 
corporations to think ‘strategically’ about such activities provides the impetus to business to 
engage more with community organisations for mutual benefit. Corporate philanthropy is a 
strategic decision that can contribute to the firm’s competitive positioning in terms of 
attracting customers, employees, or strategic partners.   
The fourth reason to consider is, corporate philanthropy is a product that can be marketed to 
the public (Collins, 1994; Lowengard, 1989; Simon, 1995). It is an investment of resources 
that can benefit the firm (Bennett 1998) through enhanced reputation which in turn may bring 
employee recruitment and retention benefits, create more customer interest and purchases and 
reduce public and regulatory scrutiny. Bruch and Walter (2005:50) reinforce these dual needs 
suggesting that it is ‘only philanthropic activities that both create true value for the 
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beneficiaries and enhance the company’s business performance are sustainable in the long 
run’. 
Consequently, this research is motivated by the importance of determining the role corporate 
philanthropy plays in the management of reputational risk and shareholder value.  Boards 
need a definitive basis on which to judge the benefits of corporate philanthropy to the 
community and to the sustainability of the company itself.   
The results of the study suggest that, while directly controlling for endogeneity with three 
least 3SLS, that increasing firms’ investment in corporate giving increases the likelihood that 
there will be an increase in shareholder value given the association between reputation risk 
management and corporate giving.  The negative association between corporate giving and 
shareholder value is mitigated by the firm’s reputation risk management. That is, the market 
foresees that the impact of corporate giving on reputational risk management occurs in the 
future and hence is included in an increase in shareholder value. 
In the next section we discuss the background to the research and identify the research 
questions we will address in this study. 
Background and Research Questions 
A passive or reactive approach to managing corporate reputation is unsustainable in today’s 
environment. This is due to many factors such as: increased public awareness about corporate 
activities, increased demand for transparency, higher expectations by multiple stakeholder 
groups, social media, effect of the influence of opinion leaders, the growth in interest groups 
and increased attention from media (Shamma, 2012). Companies need to actively manage 
their reputations and not merely react to situations of heightened reputation risk. Corporations 
can use donations as a way to manage their reputation risk evidenced through research which 
6 
 
finds that firms that have higher levels of philanthropic expenditures have better reputations 
(Brammer and Millington, 2005).  Society has evolved since the era of shareholder 
opposition to corporate philanthropy as a valid business activity expressed through views 
such as Friedman (1970).  Ditley-Simonson and Midttun (2010, 27) posit instead that in the 
current context of higher scrutiny there is a longer term approach to profit or value-
maximising business strategies that involves philanthropy. 
Lastly, Godfrey (2005: 777) makes 3 theoretical assertions: “(1) corporate philanthropy can 
generate positive moral capital among communities and stakeholders, (2) moral capital can 
provide shareholders with insurance-like protection for a firm’s relationship-based intangible 
assets, and (3) this protection contributes to shareholder wealth”. Research supporting these 
assertions finds that a positive relationship between philanthropy and performance is stronger 
for firms with greater public visibility (reputation) and for those with better past performance, 
as philanthropy by these firms gains more positive stakeholder responses (Wang and Qian, 
2011).  
To address these issues enlightened stakeholder theory is used to develop a theoretical model 
of the business case for the relation between corporate philanthropy, corporate reputation 
management and shareholder value. Enlightened Stakeholder Theory, developed by Jensen 
(2001), recognises that a firm adopting a single-minded approach to realise maximum value 
for shareholders to the detriment of various stakeholder groups is unlikely to succeed. For 
example, paying minimum salaries to employees and requiring them to work in very poor 
conditions is likely to have a negative effect on productivity which may more than offset any 
cost-savings and so actually reduces the value of the firm.  
 A firm’s ability to generate sustainable wealth over time, and hence its long-term value, is 
determined by its relationships with critical stakeholders. Enlightened stakeholder theory 
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suggests that management has to consider the impact of its decisions on a broad spectrum of 
stakeholders however, consistent with agency theory, they must ultimately evaluate all 
decisions on the basis of their impact on the market value of the company. 
That is, management should still apply net present value analysis to every decision. In other 
words, no investment or financing should be undertaken by the firm unless the present value 
of the associated incremental benefits exceeds the present value of the incremental costs. In 
this framework, it is highly possible that investment in some corporate social responsibility 
activities will have a positive impact on the value of the firm and thus be justified.  
Activities that bring reputational benefits to the company will increase both profitability and 
market valuation in the longer-term. Examples of this could include decisions to improve 
product quality or donate to medical research, both of which might have an initial detrimental 
impact on profitability but contribute to the improvement in the company’s market image. 
This may then translate to increases in both profitability and market valuation in the longer-
term. 
The three core concepts explored in this project are corporate philanthropy, reputation risk 
and shareholder value.  Corporate philanthropy is an ‘unconditional transfer of cash or other 
asset to an entity or settlement or cancellation of its liabilities in a voluntary nonreciprocal 
transfer by another entity acting other than as an owner’ (FASB, 1993:2). Since the reputation 
of an organisation ‘is based on the sum of how all constituencies view the organisation’ 
(Argenti, 2005: 3), then reputation risk is the risk of a change in the way an organisation is 
perceived by its various stakeholders.  Lastly shareholder value is the expected discounted 
value of a firm’s anticipated cash flow stream from the employment of its tangible and 
intangible assets consistent with the Capital Asset Pricing Model (Breasley et al. in Godfrey, 
2005).   
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Christensen and Raynor (2003) indicate that the factors that create a reputation within the 
private sector are: long term financial performance; corporate governance and leadership; 
corporate social responsibility; workplace talent and culture; delivery of external partners’ 
promises; regulatory compliance and communication and crisis management.   Murray (2003) 
further states that managing reputation is more about the risk associated with the relationship 
the organisation has with stakeholders and the public, as their perception of the organisation 
contributes to the reputation of that organisation.  Essentially ‘reputation management is an 
evolving set of practices that leading companies are developing to help them cope with the 
changing expectations of their audiences, to manage the interpretations those audiences 
make, and to build favourable regard’ (Fombrun quoted in Schulz et al., 2000: 95). 
 
Brotzen Mayer in Atkins et al. (2006: 8) provide the following example ‘if a company has a 
reputation for putting profit before principle, it will face a tougher battle to protect its 
reputation.  Companies that weather a crisis of reputation have often accumulated ‘credit in 
the bank’ with the public and stakeholders’.  In other words, a company with a good, solid 
reputation will often withstand a threat to its reputation during a crisis, as it has a greater 
agility and reservoir of goodwill to withstand the impact of the crisis. This is also commonly 
referred to as moral capital and the literature suggests that building a stock of ‘moral capital’ 
can be critical in guarding a company’s reputation.   
This study extends this theory by determining whether investing in philanthropy builds a 
bank of moral capital. Researchers such as Gardberg and Fombrun (2006) and Godfrey et al. 
(2009) find that a good reputation can act as robust protection when negative events occur.  
Godfrey et al. (2009: 442) affirm that their results ‘indicated that managers of firms who 
engage in CSR activity can create value at times for their shareholders through the creation of 
insurance-link protection’. Dowling (2006) proposes that the reputation of a company is the 
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ultimate responsibility of the board, unlike many reputation experts who believe it lies with 
the CEO and other executives. Trust, which is an integral component of reputation and 
company performance, can be improved in the minds of stakeholders, as the company’s 
reputation increases.  This leads to the question: how can a company act with high morality 
and portray this behaviour to stakeholders to gain a good reputation?  
Although there is a definite agreement by researchers that corporate philanthropy does 
influence the publics’ perceptions of a firm (Smith, 1994; Himmelstein, 1997; Saiia et al, 
2003), whether this correlation is positive or negative is mixed.  Some research (Knauer, 
1994 and Godfrey, 2005) asserts that public goodwill is gained by participation in charitable 
activities. Brammer and Millington (2005) find that firms with higher levels of philanthropic 
expenditures have better reputations. However, there are also many who disagree with this 
proposal.  Many of the negative associations centre on public perceptions that it is self-
interest of the companies’ that motivates charitable activities. Bae and Cameron (2006) 
contend that when a company has obtained a good reputation, their philanthropic activities 
will be viewed with less scepticism thereby mitigating the self-interest perspective. However, 
they find that public scepticism in corporate giving can diminish corporate reputation.  
Consequently, it is important to have a more strategic approach to philanthropy to ensure the 
positives outweigh the negatives.  Foster et al. (2008: 759) assert that ‘companies that have 
integrated philanthropy into their operations are quite distinct in both attitudes and behaviour 
from the others’. This approach to philanthropy also is significant according to the literature.  
Saiia (2003) stated by being strategic in charitable activity selection, a firm can improve its 
‘bottom line’. 
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While the literature identifies that a good reputation leads to increased financial performance, 
the correlation between corporate philanthropy and financial performance has received mixed 
results. Friedman (1970) argued that philanthropy will have a negative impact on financial 
performance as it is simply a corporate expenditure.  Berman et al. (1999) find that corporate 
involvement in community had little influence on financial performance; while Orlitzky et al. 
(2003) find a positive correlation between corporate philanthropy and financial performance.  
 
With this background in mind, the study merges two streams of research; 1) the association 
between corporate philanthropy and reputational risk; and 2) the association between 
corporate philanthropy and shareholder value.  Merging these two areas of research we set 
out to determine whether corporate philanthropy enhances shareholder value by reducing 
reputational risk. 
 
Accordingly, the two main research questions addressed in this paper are: 
1) Does corporate philanthropy mitigate or increase firms’ reputational risk?  
2) Does shareholder valuation of corporate philanthropy depend on the level of 
reputational risk?  
 
Research Method 
 
To test the first research question requires a collection of reputational data relevant to each 
company. Based on prior research (Deephouse, 2000; Fombrun and Shanley, 1990), media 
analysis is conducted to ascertain a media reputation score. Media Agenda Setting Theory 
‘posits a relationship between the relative emphasis given by the media to various topics and 
the degree of salience these topics have for the general public’ (Ader, 1995: 300).   In other 
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words, media coverage influences public perception as it places the organisation at the 
forefront of the public’s minds.   
McCombs and Shaw (1972) investigate the agenda-setting hypothesis with fairly robust 
results.  Their study supports the theory that the media can set the tone for the public opinion 
of an organisation’s reputation. Carroll (2004) tests agenda setting in business news content. 
The study supports the notion that agenda setting predicts that more media coverage about a 
firm would result in a higher degree of public awareness of that firm. Data is collected from a 
variety of media sources of each participating company.  The information collected is coded 
using the content analysis computer software, NVivo. A select sample was initially coded by 
hand to test the results against those obtained through the computer software.  Following this 
test, the remaining data is analysed using the program.  The results from this analysis are used 
to ascertain a reputation score for each company, based on agreed metrics among the three 
researchers that indicate measures of presence and strength of good and poor reputation.   
 
Testing the second research question requires careful consideration of potential endogeneity 
between variables of corporate reputation, corporate giving and shareholder value because all 
three variables are likely to be associated. We would expect that corporate philanthropy will 
be associated with reputational risk and likewise reputational risk is associated with corporate 
philanthropy. In addition we expect that shareholder value to be associated with corporate 
philanthropy and reputational risk.   Random effects regression is likely to produce either 
non-significant coefficients or coefficients that are statistically significant but of substantially 
lower magnitude compared to three-stage least squares (3SLS) regression. This is because the 
random effects regressions will possibly produce biased standard errors and suffer from Type 
I error. In contrast the 3SLS method, which takes into account covariances between the error 
terms of different equations, is more likely to provide unbiased and consistent standard 
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errors, thus yielding more robust coefficient results and valid tests of hypotheses (Setia-
Atmaja, Tanewski and Skully, 2009)
2
.  
The main difference between two-stage least squares (2SLS) and 3SLS estimations is that 
3SLS captures cross-equation effects as error terms of individual equations in the system 
which are assumed to be contemporaneously correlated under 3SLS. Also, the 3SLS 
estimation technique is more suitable for cross-sectional studies, where some of the changes 
in firm value differ due to different investment in the community which is different for 
various levels of reputational risk. As a result, reputation risk management, corporate giving 
and firm value issues can affect each other in various ways. These interactions can be 
captured through the 3SLS estimation technique. 
To eliminate the potential endogeneity problem or reverse causality, the estimation 
endogenizes reputation risk management, corporate giving and shareholder value (Tobin’s 
Q). The three equations are solved as a system of simultaneous equations using three-stage 
least squares (3SLS) estimation method.  The 3 equations set out below are used to test the 
two research questions simultaneously. 
 
RQ1 
CorpGiving = a + B1Reputational risk +B2firm size + B3firm age + B4firm performance + 
B5FCF + B7industry + e 
         (1) 
Reputational risk = a + B1corpgiving + B2firm size + B3social + B4environmental + e (2) 
 
                                                          
2
 The Durbin–Wu–Hausman (DWH) test which determines whether there is no endogeneity in the equation (null 
hypotheses). The significant DWH tests (F(1, 681); p = 0.0000) indicate that endogeneity is present in the OLS 
estimates and the instruments have corrected for it.  
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The next step in the analysis tests the mediating role of reputational risk on the association 
between philanthropic expenditures and shareholder value. 
RQ2 
Shareholder valuet+1 = a + B1reputational risk + B2philanthropic expenditures + 
B3reputational risk*philanthropic expenditures + B4controls + e     (3) 
 
Dependent variables 
These variable utilises the reputational data collected to calculate a score out of 100 for each 
company. The higher the score, the better reputation the company has meaning the more 
effective their reputation risk management. 
Philanthropic expenditure 
Unlike the 1985 UK Companies Act where companies are obliged to disclose charitable 
donations that exceed 200 pounds, there is no such disclosure requirement for Australian 
firms, any disclosure of charitable donations or community investment is entirely voluntary. 
Firms that disclose that they are involved in community investment either provide a narrative 
and amounts donated/in-kind or a narrative only. Unlike previous research which has used the 
absolute figure for charitable donations (eg. Brammer and Millington), our measure of 
philanthropic expenditure is a measure of charitable donations as a percentage of profit 
before tax.  This is supplemented with disclosure of community investment where available, 
that is, we add this amount to charitable donations if disclosed. 
Shareholder value 
The last component of the study is an investigation of shareholder value and shareholder 
wealth using two market measures. First, TSR = total shareholder return or return on 
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common stock consists of the [year-end closing price of a firm’s stock + dividends per share] 
/ the share price of the previous year.  This measure reflects the one-year total gain (loss) a 
shareholder receives for holding the firm’s common stock (Bloom and Milkovich, 1998; 
Kren and Kerr, 1997). Second, Tobin’s Q = the market value of the firm / replacement value 
of assets which a simple measure of Tobin’s Q as adopted by Agrawal and Knoeber (1996).  
The market value of the firm is the market value of equity (total number of issued shares by 
the ordinary share price at year-end) and debt (total of short and long-term debt).  The 
replacement value of the firm’s assets is the book value of total assets.  This simple measure 
of Tobin’s Q is adopted because it is highly correlated (0.93) with the traditionally inflation-
adjusted figures and ease of computation.  Shareholder value is measured at t and we include 
t-1 to control for reverse causality. Including lagged performance (TOBINSQt-1) as an 
independent variable allows for performance persistence and for feedback from past 
performance to current corporate giving (Bohren and Strom, 2010; Wooldridge, 2002). 
Inclusion of the lag of the dependent variable is likely to mitigate concerns over reverse 
causality and omitted variables. To the extent that omitted correlated variables are relatively 
stable, their effects can be captured by lagged values of the dependent variable. 
Independent variables 
We collected the following dummy variables related to corporate giving to determine if they 
are correlated with the measure of reputational risk. 
Secondment scheme = Employee secondment can include allowing staff to spend (paid) time 
working on or providing services to community/charitable activities. For example, reading 
in schools or time off for volunteering activities. 
Payroll giving = The Company has a payroll giving scheme 
Gifts in kind = The Company provides equipment or low-rent premises 
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Detailed report provided = The Company has a Community Report published giving details 
of projects supported 
Board member community involvement = The Company has a Board Member with overall 
responsibility for community involvement 
Senior manager named for community involvement =The Company has a senior manager 
responsible for community involvement. 
Control variables  
The two papers which consider research question closest to ours  are Godfrey et al. (2009) 
and Brammer and Millington (2005).  We draw on these papers to determine the appropriate 
control variables to reduce the possibility of biased results from omitted variables.  Godfrey 
at al. (2009) identifies the following firm characteristics that are likely to be associated with 
corporate giving: firm size, industry, return on assets (ROA), leverage. We also control for 
the following variables that are likely to impact corporate giving (model 1): free cash flows 
measured as gross cash flow less gross investment. Free cash flow is not affected by capital 
structure as the tax benefits of debt are reversed out, company age and industry, older 
companies and certain industries are likely to give to charity. 
In the reputation risk model (2) we control for firms that have social externalities (e.g. 
gambling, alcohol, tobacco, pharmaceuticals, and defence) or environmental impacts (e.g. 
chemical, mining and utilities) as they are likely to have an impact on reputation (Brammer 
and Millington, 2005). Firm size and profit before tax (PBT) are also likely to be associated 
with reputational risk. The controls in the shareholder value model (3) are chosen by their 
impact on shareholder value and having no association with reputation risk or corporate 
giving. It is unlikely that the year, the previous year’s shareholder value or the current years 
leverage is going to have any direct association on the current years reputation risk or 
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corporate giving.  Firm size is included in all the models as it is an important variable of 
nearly all factors.  
Sample 
The sample consists of the top 330 Australian publicly listed firms for 2011, 2012 and 2013 
that engaged in philanthropic activities as disclosed in the annual report.  These years were 
chosen to separate crisis giving from regular giving.   Prior years included several major 
disasters such as the floods in 2010, fires in 2008 and Tsunami in 2004. Consequently, we 
chose 2011, 2012 and 2013 as the most recent years without a major disaster.  Disclosure of 
the dollar value of philanthropic activities is required to measure the significance of the 
activity as a percentage of total revenue.  We started with a sample size of 330 which was 
reduced to 300 after eliminating firms with missing variables. 
Results 
Table 1 reports the industry frequencies for the sample of 330 Australian firms before the 
reduction to test the research questions.  The most frequent industry in our sample is oil and 
gas (14.8 percent) followed by mining (9.7 percent). Table 2 Panel A summarizes the 
descriptive statistics for the continuous variables of the pooled balanced panel of 330 
observations for 2011 to 2013 firms and Panel B provides the descriptive for the categorical 
variables. The average score for reputational risk management is 65 percent out of a possible 
100 percent. The average corporate giving as a percentage of profit before tax is 0.31 percent. 
The average TOBINSQt is 0.91 and the average TSRt of 5.98.  Nearly one-third the sample 
(32 percent) is in an industry that has some impact on the environment while only 8.2 percent 
are in an industry that has a social impact. Fifty-one percent of the sample provides GRI 
compliant reports. 
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Table 3 shows the Pearson 2-tailed correlation matrix.  This table demonstrates a significant 
positive correlation between reputation risk management and the following:  corporate giving 
and the non-financial components of the organisations philanthropic activities, employee 
secondment can include allowing staff to spend (paid) time working on or providing services 
to community/charitable activities. For example, reading in schools or time off for 
volunteering activities. The Company has a payroll giving scheme The Company provides 
equipment or low-rent premises.  The Company has a Community Report published giving 
details of projects supported. The Company has a Board Member with overall responsibility 
for community involvement. The Company has a senior manager responsible for community 
involvement. Corporate giving is also significantly associated with the log of market capital 
and leverage. 
Table 4 reports the results from testing the research questions simultaneously. Panel A 
presents the results for the 3SLS estimation of the three equations in which shareholder value 
is measured as Tobin’s Q  while shareholder returns (TSR) is reported in Panel B. Column 1 
of Table 4 Panel A shows the effect of reputation risk on corporate giving as specified by Eq. 
(1). Column 2 shows the effect of corporate giving on reputation (Eq. 2). Column 3 shows the 
effect of reputation risk and corporate giving on Tobin’s Q (Eq. 3).  
Panel A (column 1) of Table 4 shows that reputation risk management is a significant 
determinant of corporate giving which supports H1. Corporate giving is positively associated 
with reputation risk management (B = 0.184; p < 0.001). Column 2 shows that corporate 
giving is also positively associated with reputation risk (B= 5.33; p < 0.001). Column 3 
shows that corporate giving is negatively associated with Tobin’s Q (B= -1.084; p < 0.05) and 
reputational risk is positively associated with Tobin’s Q (B= 0.052; p < 0.01). The economic 
significance of this result is that for every cent in the dollar the firm spends on corporate 
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giving, Tobin’s Q will decrease by 0.413%. In contrast, if the firm increase their reputation 
by 1 point then Tobin’s Q will increase by 0.267%.  Consequently, the interaction of 
corporate giving and reputation risk management is positively associated with shareholder 
value (B = 0.007; p < 0.10). This result means that the firm should manage it reputation while 
concurrently increasing its corporate giving if it wants to increase shareholders’ value of the 
firm. In other words, the market places greater value on the contributions of corporations 
when the firm also manages its reputation.  
Panel B reports no significant associations between corporate giving or reputation risk 
management and shareholder wealth. There are several plausible reasons for the differences 
in the results for shareholder value and shareholder wealth. Shareholder value (Tobin’s Q) is 
measured using firm value which incorporates forward looking information and market 
perception.  Tobin’s Q is measured as the market value of the firm divided by replacement 
value of assets.
  
If Tobin’s Q is greater than one, the market value of shareholder and creditor 
investment is greater than the amortized historical cost of the assets.  Because Tobin’s Q 
measures the market value of shareholder and creditor investment it encompasses a market 
assessment of the investment opportunity set and future cash flows of the firm. Shareholder 
return (TSR) is a measure of the return to stock holders which is based on past performance. 
This measure reflects the one-year total gain (loss) a shareholder receives for holding the 
firm’s common stock.  The decision to pay dividends will be adversely affected by corporate 
giving as there will be less cash to pay dividends by definition. 
The results of the study suggest that, while directly controlling for endogeneity with 3SLS, 
that increasing firms’ investment in corporate giving increases the likelihood that there will 
be an increase in shareholder value given the association between reputation risk 
management and corporate giving.  That is, the market foresees that the impact of corporate 
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giving on reputational risk management occurs in the future and hence is included in an 
increase in shareholder value. 
 
Conclusion 
The purpose of this study is to examine the influence of corporate philanthropy on corporate 
reputation and shareholder value. Particular attention is paid to the role that corporate giving 
and reputation risk management play in determining shareholder value.  The study finds that 
it is the interplay of corporate giving and reputation risk management that is positively 
associated with shareholder value. Taken separately, corporate giving is negatively associated 
with shareholder value while reputation risk management is positively related to shareholder 
value.  This result means if firms want to be viewed favourably for their involvement in 
corporate giving they must also concurrently manage their reputation. 
The limitation inherent in this study is that our sample is limited to firms that disclose of the 
actual amount of funds corporations invest.  There seems to be reluctance by many 
corporations to disclose how much they give.  Future research could investigate the reasons 
for lack of disclosure. 
The findings of this study aid in building a stronger theoretical and practical foundation for 
corporate philanthropy. The main contribution is that overall, that firms that engage in 
corporate philanthropy (for whatever motivation) must also improve their reputation to 
increase their shareholder value.  Consequently, our results are aligned with enlightened 
stakeholder theory because we find that corporate philanthropy may have an initial 
detrimental impact on profitability but contributes to the improvement in the company’s 
market image which then translates to increases in market valuation in the longer-term. Our 
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results support the notion that corporate philanthropy has not only the benefits to society, but 
also distinct financial benefits to an organisation. 
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Table 1 
Industry Frequencies 
Industry number percent 
Mining 32 9.7 
Construction and materials 19 5.8 
Financial services 24 7.3 
Gas and water 12 3.6 
Industry transport 15 4.5 
Travel and leisure 22 6.7 
Chemicals 12 3.6 
General industrials 9 2.7 
Healthcare 17 5.2 
Banks 18 5.5 
Real estate 10 3.0 
Oil equipment 7 2.1 
Industrial metals  12 3.6 
Oil and gas 16 14.8 
Support 12 3.6 
Beverages 7 2.1 
Real estate trusts 24 7.3 
Software 6 1.8 
Pharmaceuticals 4 1.2 
General retail 17 5.2 
Food and beverage 5 1.5 
Food 3 9 
Non-life insurance 6 1.8 
Telecommunications 5 1.5 
Food and drugs 6 1.8 
Metal products 2 6.8 
Electricity 3 9 
Aviation 2 6 
Energy 2 6 
 330 100 
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Table 2 Descriptives 
Panel A 
 
REP 
RISK 
PBT 
$’000s 
CORP 
GIVING
% ROAt 
MKTCAPt 
$’000s 
FCFt 
$’000s TSRt TOBQt COAGE 
LEVER 
AGGE 
TA 
$’000s 
Mean 65.007 1168919 0.321 0.076 12161018829 -1190000 5.985 0.912 43.07 2.343 42500000 
Median 65.000 319745 0.425 0.061 4054902078 119000 5.871 0.510 28.00 1.913 5990000 
Std. Dev 12.643 3363820 0.841 0.067 26599790751 11100000 3.649 1.379 38.378 1.684 138000000 
Minimum 31.0 -2955500 0.000 0-.207 .0000 -82600000 0.250 -0.641 <1.00 0.8118 8638 
Maximum 93.0 31225000 7.846 0.442 233129000000 71600000 40.703 9.185 179 17.374 808000000 
Panel B Dichotomous variables  
Variable  total No# 1 % 
GRI REPORTING 300 153 51 
SOCIAL 330 27 8.2 
ENVIRONMENTAL 330 107 32.4 
SECONDMENT SCHEME 301 131 39.7 
GIFTS IN KIND 301 220 26.7 
DETAILED REPORT 330 261 79.1 
PAYROLL GIVING 301 134 91.2 
BOARD MEMBER IN COMMUNITY INVOLVEMENT 294 57 17.3 
SENIOR MANAGER COMMUNITY INVOLVEMENT 293 113 34.2 
    
GRI REPORTING are the firms in the sample that provide GRI compliant reports 
SOCIAL  externalities  are gambling, alcohol, tobacco, and pharmaceuticals 
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ENVIRONMENTAL  impacts are chemicals , mining and utilities 
Employee secondment can include allowing staff to spend (paid) time working on or providing services to community/charitable activities. For 
example, reading in schools or time off for volunteering activities. 
The Company has a payroll giving scheme 
The Company provides equipment or low-rent premises 
The Company has a Community Report published giving details of projects supported 
The Company has a Board Member with overall responsibility for community involvement 
The Company has a senior manager responsible for community involvement 
Definitions: 
 REPRISK: reputation risk score out of 100;CORPGIVING: corporate giving as a percentage of profit before tax TOBQt: the market value of equity 
and debt divided by the book value of total assets in year t;TOBQt-1: prior year TOBQ;  LNMKTCAP: Closing share price on the last day of the 
company's financial year * number of shares outstanding at the end of the period, logged; ROAt: current year ROA [Net Income + Interest 
Expense*(1-Corporate Tax Rate)]/[Total Assets - Outside Equity Interests;  INDY: dummy variable 1 for mining and travel and leisure; FCFt:  Free 
cash flows (profit after tax - changes in capital expenditure + depreciation & amortization - changes in working capital);  SOCIAL:  Dummy variable 
where gambling, alcohol, tobacco, and pharmaceuticals,1: 0 otherwise. ENVIRON :  Dummy variable where chemicals , mining and utilities,1: 0 
otherwise; PBTt: Profit before tax;  LNTAt = Total assets, logged;, 0 otherwise; LEVERAGE: total assets divided by total liabilities; YEAR: dummy 
variable 1 for 2011, 2012, 2013; 0 otherwise. 
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 Table 3: Pearsons Correlations (N = 300) 
 
REP 
RISK SOCIAL 
ENVIR 
ON GRI PBTt 
CORP 
GIVE 
SEC 
OND 
PAY 
ROLL  GIFTS 
DET 
AIL 
BRD 
MEM 
SNR 
MGT ROAt 
LN 
MKTC
APt FCFt LEVt 
LN 
TAt TRSt 
TOBQ
t 
CO 
AGE 
 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 
1 1.000                                      
2 -0.092 1.000                                    
3 0.008 -.211** 1.000  
                
4 .246** -0.1059 0.2713 1.00                                 
5 .179** -0.085 .129* .276** 1.000                               
6 .157** -0.051 -0.013 .270** 0.072 1.000                             
7 .190** -.155** -0.018 .325** .236** .146* 1.000                           
8 .340** -.119* -0.031 .240** .278** .144* .374** 1.000                         
9 .233** -.191** -0.083 .306** .175** .177** .124* .180** 1.000                       
10 .289** -0.083 -0.021 .245** .149** .154** .304** .325** .481** 1.000                     
11 .185** -.157** 0.087 .264** .344** .148* .301** .314** .209** .224** 1.000                   
12 .363** -.159** -0.001 .393** .309** .258** .367** .417** .262** .333** .487** 1.000                 
13 -.140* 0.098 0.070 -.194** 0.045 -0.024 -0.026 -.166** -.173** -0.059 -.187** -.356** 1.000               
14 .351** 0.093 .083* .465** .660** .307** .376** .426** .371** .291** .356** .348** -0.137 1.000             
15 -0.053 0.037 0.099 -.155* -.213** -0.009 -0.092 -0.114 -0.064 -0.056 -.170** -.172** .157** -.277** 1.000           
16 .326** -2.111** -0.036 -.008 .519*** 0.304** .314** .470** .384** 0.295** .353** .598** -.553* .790** -.347* 1.000         
17 0.075 -0.090 -.129* .447** .519** 0.035 .226** .289** .167** .143* .306** .334** -.231** .790** -.667** -.190** 1.000       
18 0.058 -0.098 -.143* .008 -0.001 -0.001 0.113 .143* -0.006 0.032 0.008 .115* -0.017 0.024 -0.083 0.103 .138* 1.000     
19 -0.113 .129* 0.020 -.243** -0.036 0.033 -0.006 -.218** -.206** -0.075 -.149* -.295** .798** -0.136 0.081 .241** -.571** -.126* 1.000   
20 0.092 -0.014 .276** 0.093 .199** 0.024 0.094 .217** .142* .263** .229** .188** -0.021 .221** 0.041 0.074 0.105 -.128* -0.027 1.000 
 **. Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level (2-tailed). 
 *. Correlation is significant at the 0.05 level (2-tailed). 
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Table 4:  
Determinants of shareholder value (Tobin’s Q and TSR). This table presents the instrumental variables in the form of 3SLS regression models. The first-stage model 
is not reported for parsimony. The results of simultaneously testing the three equations for the role of corporate giving, reputation risk management and performance 
are presented. Two-tailed Z statistics in parentheses significant at 0.01 ***; 0.05**; 0.10*; levels. 
 Panel A:  Tobins Qt Panel B: TSRt 
 CORP 
GIVING 
 REP 
RISK 
 TOBQt  CORP 
GIVING 
 REP 
RISK 
 TSRt  
CONS 1222.44  -143.87  38.05  1084.27  -143.86  -61.14  
 (4.01) *** (-2.31) ** (2.88) *** (3.85) *** (-2.31) ** (-1.29)  
CORPGIVINGt   5.330  -1.084    5.958  -2.643  
   (8.63) *** (2.30) **   (9.96) *** (-1.32)  
REPRISKt 0.184    0.052  0.166    -0.077  
 (10.31) ***   (3.26) *** (10.59) ***   (-1.19)  
CORPGIV*REPRISK     0.007      0.027  
     (1.85) *     (1.56)  
ROAt 1.391      1.748      
 (2.19) **     (2.73) ***     
LNMKTCAPt -193.169      -171.368      
 (-4.40) ***     (-3.38) ***     
FCFt <0.000      <0.000      
 (0.1)      (-0.15)      
COAGEt -0.0001      -0.0001      
 (0.15)      (0.13)      
SOCIALt   0.512      0.513    
   (0.61)      (0.61)    
ENVIRONt   0.737      0.815    
   (1.42)      (1.49)    
LNTAt   50.609  -10.073    57.977  17.019  
   (3.32) *** (-2.94) ***   (3.57) *** (1.38)  
PBTt             
   1.48e-10      1.75e-10    
TOBQt-1/TSRt-1   1.44  0.822    (1.67) *   
     (22.91) ***       
LEVERAGE     -0.010      -0.186  
     (-0.42)      (-1.62) * 
INDUSTRY NOT SIGNIF      NOT SIGNIF      
             
2012     0.025      0.382  
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     (0.27)      (0.86) ** 
2013     0.120      1.172  
     (1.21)      (2.50) ** 
N 299  299  299  299  299  299  
CH1 
2
 216.33 *** 77.27 *** 1342.03 *** 206.28 *** 117.53 *** 211.33 *** 
First stage Adj R
2 
0.614  0.153  0.881  0.614  0.158  0.484  
Definitions: 
Endogenous variables: REPRISK: reputation risk score out of 100;CORPGIVING: corporate giving as a percentage of profit before tax TOBQt: the market value of equity and debt 
divided by the book value of total assets in year t;TOBQt-1: prior year TOBQ;  
Exogenous variables: CORPGV*RREPRISK:  interaction term. LNMKTCAP: Closing share price on the last day of the company's financial year * number of shares outstanding at the 
end of the period, logged; ROAt: current year ROA [Net Income + Interest Expense*(1-Corporate Tax Rate)]/[Total Assets - Outside Equity Interests;  INDY: dummy variable 1 for mining and 
travel and leisure; FCFt:  Free cash flows (profit after tax - changes in capital expenditure + depreciation & amortization - changes in working capital);  SOCIAL:  Dummy variable 
where gambling, alcohol, tobacco, and pharmaceuticals,1: 0 otherwise. ENVIRON :  Dummy variable where chemicals , mining and utilities,1: 0 otherwise; PBTt: Profit before tax;  
LNTAt = Total assets, logged;, 0 otherwise; LEVERAGE: total assets divided by total liabilities; YEAR: dummy variable 1 for 2011, 2012, 2013; 0 otherwise. 
 
 
